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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF Ui AM, i 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
l '" « 
DEVON KINNE, 
Defet .
 : 
: CaseNo.20060566-SC 
Consolidated under Case No.: 20060508-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
ITi AH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from me Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, dated April 20,2006, (the 
"Decision") and designated as Stale v. kimu,, .H'nn i I 'i|i|i MM NMii 'U IUIII.V I \ 
copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum A and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVDTW 
ISSUE 1: Whether this Court's holding in State v. Reyes. 116 P.Sd 305 (Utah 
2005) applied to the Court of Appeals' consideration of Appellant's 
appeal, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing 
Appellant's challenges to the reasonable doubt jury instruction for 
plain error? 
vUAKi REVIEW: "Determining the propriety of the instructions 
submitted to the jury presents a question of la« 
instructions under a correction of error standard." State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, 
17, 56 P.3d 969, (Utah App.,2002) citing Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 
App.1993.) 
ISSUE 2: Whether the instruction that the State's evidence must "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt" constituted reversible error in light of this 
Court's holding in Reyes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: We review jury instructions under a correctness 
standard, granting no particular deference to the trial court. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 
11th Ave. Corp.. 850P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 
(Utah Ct.App.1995), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). State v. S t r e a m . 957 
P.2d 602,607, (Utah App.,1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. V, which reads as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
n. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. VI, which reads as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
o 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. XIV § 1, which reads as 
follows: 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws 
I I CONST., ART. I § 7, which reads that, "No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
II i ill" (JONST., ART I & 1I, \\ Inch reads as foll< >ws: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or' n lie in whole or in part at any preliminary 
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examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
VI. UT. CONST., ART. I § 24, which states that "[a]ll laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 23, 2004, Devon Kinne ("Kinne") was charged by Information with 
Burglary, a second degree felony, and Theft, a second degree felony. Vol. I, pp. 1-21. 
On January 27, 2004, Kinne was charged separately by Information with Receiving or 
Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or Semitrailer, a second degree felony; and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. Vol. II, pp. 1-2. 
On September 16, 2005, the matter came for jury trial before Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson. Tr. at p. 3. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Kinne guilty on all 
charges. Vol. I, pp. 109-110; Vol. II, pp. 94-95. 
On October 18, 2004, Kinne was sentenced to one to fifteen years each on the 
Burglary, Theft and Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or 
Semitrailer, charges, and six months on the Possession of Drug Paraphernalia charge, all 
to be served concurrently. Vol. I, pp.133-134; Vol. II, pp. 117-118. On October 18, 
2004, the trial court entered two separate Judgment and Order of Commitment (the 
'Judgments"). 
1
 The record on appeal contains two separate pleadings files on the separate charges in this 
matter. Unfortunately, these were not paginated together, but both begin with page 1. To 
avoid confusion, Appellant will cite to the separate records as follows: for the charges filed 
January 23,2005, Appellant will designate the contents as "Vol. I" and for the charges filed 
January 27,2005, Appellant will designate the contents as "Vol. II." 
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On November 5, 2004, Kinne timely file his Notice of Appeal from the Judgments 
Vol. II, pp. 120-121. On September 6, 2005, Kinne filed his Appellant's Brief. On 
I KM. .Ivi 11 !()()., the State filed its Appellee's brief. On November 17,2005, Kinne filed 
his reply brief. On April 20, 2006, the Utah Court .tl A|i|M'nls issued it,-, MniiorMiiJiiiu 
Decision (the "Decision"), holding that as long as the jury instruction as whole correctly 
II mv < val Ihe principle of "beyond a reasonable doubt," there was no error. The Decision 
is in direct conflict with State v. Reyes and State v. Lopez. On June 5, 2006, Appellant 
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Certiorari was granted by this Court on July 28, 
2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early December of 2003, a burglary was reported at Mr. Stephen Schultz's 
("Schult/ I ivsidnue li ui |i •!•> I h-pnh Mike I lam (hereinafter "Deputy Harris") 
was dispatched to the Schultz residence were he gathered evidence and took photographs. 
Tr. at pp. 49, M, 32 Schultz identified several items that had been taken from his 
residence, including a video i .inKiH hand i^m Iwn -liol, !• Iwn nIKs, ,i lUreo ny^luii, 
and two CD players. Tr. at p. 60. 
On January 4, 2004, San Juan County Sheriffs Department received a call from a 
Julie Rogers (hereinafter "Rogers1), wlie v, llu- inHlin "I Kinm- mdu .itin^ '!M< 'U' <>«' 
was at Julie Day's (hereinafter "Day") in LaSal with a vehicle that belonged to Rogers 
and she wanted the vehicle returned. Tr. at p 64 Deputy Harris was dispatched to 
investigate the matter and whe» Das . • 
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or a Jeep Cherokee at the Day residence. Tr. at pp. 64-65. Deputy Harris ran a check 
through dispatch on the Jeep and found that it was stolen from the Salt Lake area. Id. 
Deputy Harris was invited into the Day residence, where he knocked on a bedroom 
door, where Christopher Clark ("Clark")* was sleeping. Tr. at pp. 65-66. Clark opened 
the door and Deputy Harris entered the bedroom and asked Clark for identification. Id. 
Deputy Harris then asked Clark who the vehicle belonged to and Clark told him that it was 
his mother's vehicle. Id. Deputy Harris then arrested Clark and took him to his patrol car. 
Id. 
Before Deputy Harris re-entered the back bedroom of the residence, Day walked 
out carrying a pistol hooked on her finger, informing Deputy Harris that it was in the 
mattress of the bed where Clark was sleeping. Id. Deputy Harris' further investigation 
located a key on the floor that operated the stolen Jeep. Id. After discovering the key, 
Deputy Harris again asked Clark who the vehicle belonged to and Clark informed him that 
it was a friend's mother's vehicle and that he and Kinne had borrowed it to come and see 
Kinne's mother. Tr. at p. 67. Upon a search of the Jeep, Deputy Harris found a set of 
scales, a mirror, a syringe, and a bunch of little baggies. Tr. at p. 71. When questioned, 
Clark indicated that those items were owned by Kinne. Id. 
Prior to Clark's trial he reported to Deputy Harris that the vehicle that belonged to 
Rogers had broken down and that he and Kinne found the Jeep running in the driveway in 
Salt Lake, so they jumped in and drove to Monticello. Tr. at pp. 75 and 76. Deputy 
Harris also asked Clark about the firearm that was found at the Day residence. Tr. at p. 
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76. Clark told him that Kinne gave it to him to hold for him. Tr. at pp. 76-77. Kinne had 
shown Clark the gun and stereo and told Clark they were taken from the robbery in LaSal. 
Tr rill p. 77 
On January 23, 2004, Kinne was charged by Information with Burglary, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202, a second degree felony, and Theft in violation 
ofUTAHCODE 76-6-404 n second clrgrtT ftioii'. Vol I pp I '" Mn human 26, 
2004, Kinne was charged by Information with Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor 
Vehicle, Trailer, or Semi-Trailer in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §41-la-1316, a second 
degree felony, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia iiii violahoi ml H'hiM nm- ANN § 
58-37a-5(l), a class B misdemeanor. Vol. II, pp. 1-2. 
On September !' 005, this matter came for jury trial before Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Courl Prior to the deliberations at 
trial the jury was given the following reasonable doubt instruction; 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the trial. If a 
defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant 
should be acquitted. The State must eliminate all reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable 
doubt is doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in the view of all the 
evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination , or 
wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough 
proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to 
act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based 
upon the evidence in the case. 
Vol II pp 1(104 (Emphasis addc 
guilty on all charges. Vol. I, pp. 109-110; Vol. II, pp. 94-95. 
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On October 18, 2004, Kinne was sentenced to one to fifteen years each on the 
Burglary, Theft and Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or 
Semitrailer, charges, and six months on the Possession of Drug Paraphernalia charge, all 
to be served concurrently. Vol I, pp. 133-134; Vol. II, pp. 117-118. On October 18, 
2004, the trial court entered the Judgments. Vol. I p. 133 and Vol. II p. 117. On 
November 5, 2004, Kinne timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgments. Vol. II, 
pp. 120-121. On Appeal, Kinne challenged the reasonable doubt jury instruction, and 
claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict. After 
full briefing of the issues, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction as a whole correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, and 
that Kinne's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict 
because enough evidence had been presented by the State. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In a decision handed down on June 7, 2005, this Court determined that a reasonable 
doubt jury instruction containing the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it 
the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt in a criminal case based on a degree of 
proof below the requisite "beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f30. 
On April 13, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision in State v. Halls. 2006 
UT App 142, - P.3d~, which relies upon Reyes and the use of the phrase "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" in a jury instruction. In a related case, consolidated herein, the Court of 
Appeals applied the plain error standard and ruled that there was no error and no injustice 
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in using this phrase, as long as the instruction ns ;i whole correctly conveyed the principle 
of reasonable doubt to the jury. Halls at f20. In rendering its decision in the instant 
matter, the Court of Appeals relied upon Halls. The Court of Appeals decision in Halls. 
and subsequently here' "itradicts this ( Oiirt's holding in Reyes by failing lo recognize 
the substantial risk inherent with the phrase. Additionally, use of the phrase in Kinne's 
reasonable doubt jury instruction violates the standard as held in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1,114 S. Ct. 1239,127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THEIR DECISION 
REGARDING THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
T THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE 
PLAIN ERROR STANDARD IN A MATTER WHERE THE LAW HAD 
CLEARLY CHANGED ON APPEAL 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently decided the case of State v. Halls. 2006 UT 
App 142, - P.3d -, in which it determined that, although this Court abandoned the 
language oP'oh'i,;,!, ill n-.iM,n,ihk ,l.„.lii m State v. Reves. JA)(\'< III \\ I If. IJ Ul llh 
the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" did not create manifest injustice because the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction taken as a whole correctly conveyed the principle of 
reasonable doubt to I In |inv llalL, M ]\M) I In inhnvnl ink .is.sndiuVd \\\\\\ iiistiiklmg 
the jury using this phrase was not addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Halls or 
herein. In issuing the Decision in this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals relied on Victor. 
Reves. State v. Liu/. .'OIK III l \ L!,"1 P Ul VII, and .. olding Hint il lln |tn\ 
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instruction as a whole correctly conveyed the concept of the standard of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt," the instruction was adequate, Kinne at | 1 . The same phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" as used in Halls was also used in the jury instruction at 
Kinne's trial, and argued before the Utah Court of Appeals. By ruling that the instruction 
as a whole correctly conveyed the principle of beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has contradicted the decision of this court in Reyes, supra, and 
argued more particularly below. 
In Reyes, this Court specifically undertook the following analysis: 
f25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial 
court erred when it failed to expressly instruct that the State's proof must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by Robertson. Id. at [^19. The 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's dissent in 
State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). There, Justice Stewart took issue with an instruction that 
equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "an abiding conviction of the 
truth of the charge." Id. He reasoned that since the standard to be applied is 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that any definition of the standard 
must reference the obstacle-reasonable doubt-to be overcome by the 
evidence, and must convey the principle that the State must surmount the 
obstacle of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a feat that in ascertaining 
the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror might 
misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard unless she is required to 
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence. 
f26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" may be, his suggestion that the jury be instructed to 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and conceptually 
suspect. Not every jury will confront evidence in its deliberations sufficient 
to create a reasonable doubt. The notion of "obviating" doubt is 
cumbersome at best where proof is scant or lacking in credibility. In these 
instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable doubt" that asks jurors to 
rate the magnitude of their conviction concerning the strength of the 
evidence imparts a more accurate and useful concept of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" than does a construct that requires jurors to identify 
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doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes them. A universal 
application of the notion that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
can be achieved only by tying it to the concept of the presumption of 
innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of inchoate reasonable 
doubts that the State must overcome to attain a conviction, it follows that the 
State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" in every case. We do not5 
however, endorse this unwieldy view of the presumption of innocence. 
f 27 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is 
also flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the 
degree of proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the 
Victor standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step 
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of 
the doubt against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth 
disputation of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the 
evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is 
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for 
it. An unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of 
proof will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit. 
%L% To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the State to 
argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's burden. Writing in the Notre 
Dame Law Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the expanding 
prominence of the requirement that doubts be articulated. Steve Sheppard, 
The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of 
Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1165 (2003). Professor Sheppard summarized the central vice of this 
trend this way: A troubling conclusion that arises from the difficulties of the 
requirement of articulability is that it hinders the juror who has a doubt 
based on the belief that the totality of the evidence is insufficient. Such a 
doubt lacks the specificity implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an 
obligation that appears focused on the details of the arguments. Yet this is 
precisely the circumstance in which the rhetoric of the law, particularly the 
presumption of innocence and the state burden of proof, require acquittal. Id 
at 1213. 
f29 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" element of Robertson is our belief that the exacting 
demands of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be clearly and 
fairly communicated through an affirmative description of the degree of 
conviction that must be attained by a juror based on the evidence. We see 
little to be gained by including within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
instruction the potentially confusing concept that every defendant is entitled 
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to a presumption of reasonable doubt, which the State's evidence must 
obviate. 
f30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" 
element of Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a 
juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we expressly abandon it 
Reves at Tf24-30 (emphasis added). 
In Halls, the Utah Court of Appeals held that, because Halls did not object to the 
jury instruction at trial, he did not meet the requirements under UT. R. Civ. P. 19(e), and 
therefore, the instruction could only be assigned an error to avoid manifest injustice. The 
Court of Appeals stated that manifest injustice is "synonymous with the plain error 
standard." Halls at % 13-14. Kinne also did not object to the instruction at trial. However, 
Kinne argues that a "plain error on appeal" standard is the standard under which this 
matter should be reviewed. The Utah Court of Appeals failed to address this standard in 
the Decision and also failed to address the issue of exceptional circumstances, as raised by 
Kinne before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Utah's "plain error" standard would have required that the trial court be aware of 
this Court's determination in Reves prior to the decision being rendered and would have 
placed an undue burden on the trial court to predict the outcome of Reves or merit reversal 
based on their failure to do so. State v. Dunn. 850 P. 2d 1201,1208-1209, (Utah, 
1993Xciting the factors for determining plain error, (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.) Exceptional circumstances are 
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explained as 'those which would explain and excuse a party's failure to raise a claimed 
error in the trial court." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App.1990). "The exceptional 
circumstances uIIKcpi smi.'< ir i Mili-iy iioviuM u J^UK ili<n m<iiiilcsi iii|uslm <loes 
not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." State v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 
920,923 (Utah App. 1991). 
Unlike "plain error," "exceptional circumstances'' is not so much a precise 
doctrine, which may be analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a 
descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even 
though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error 
doctrine does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit 
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal. 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, (Utah 
1994), this Court employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law 
or the settled interpretation of la* 
The federal courts have expanded upon the concept of "exceptional circumstances," 
as argued by Halls before the Utah Court of Appeals, and utilized in Utah courts to 
include a "plain error" concept at the stage of appeal IIIIII Joujy^ on, int." I > S Supiuik ouit 
discussed the plain error test as applied in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 
I Ml I ? I I ,i;d.2d 508. Under the Qlano test, similar to Utah's "plain error" test, "before 
an appellate court can correct an. erroi not raised at trial, there must be (1) "error," (71 that 
is "plain," and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights."507 U.S., at 732, 113 S.Ct, at 1776. 
United States v. Johnson 520 U.S. 461 46 7 : ! II 1 S.C t 154 1 15 19 137 L.Ed.2d 718 
(1997). However, in Johnson the United States Suprem* rtiis "plain error" 
standard to appeals, explaining that, "...where the law at the time of trial was settled and 
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clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the 
time of appellate consideration." Id. The Court agreed that the alternative would "...result 
in counsel's inevitably making a long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to 
rulings that were plainly supported by existing precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct. 
at 1549. 
The United States Supreme Court has also held that, "a new rule for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases — pending on direct review 
—, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the 
past." Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. at 467, citing Griffith v. Kentucky. 479 U.S. 
314 107 S. Ct.708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). The United States Supreme Court addressed 
the retroactivity analysis1 when it stated: 
Specifically, we concluded that the retroactivity analysis for convictions that 
have become final must be different from the analysis for convictions that 
are not final at the time the new decision is issued. We observed that, in a 
number of separate opinions since Linkletter [Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)], various Members of the Court 
have asserted that, at a minimum, all defendants whose cases were still 
pending on direct appeal at the time of the law-changing decision should be 
entitled to invoke the new rule." 
Griffith v. Kentucky. 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708 321-322, U.S.Ky.,1987, citing United 
States v. Johnson 57 U.S. 537, 545, 102 S.Ct, 2579, 2584, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). The 
Court decided that, because the law had changed during the time in which Johnson's case 
1
 Kinne does not intend to raise the question of whether the determination in Reyes was 
"retroactive" under the typical meaning of the word as it pertains to changes in the law in Utah, 
but raises it only as it is applied under the Johnson analysis to cases currently pending on direct 
appeal whose decisions are not yet final. 
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was pending direct review, Johnson met the first factor of the Olano test evidencing that 
there was an error. 
In the instant matter, the* U\\\ ' regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction at the 
time of Kinne's trial was settled. However, prior to Kinne's appeal being filed, the law 
had changed based on this Court's holding in Reyes. Therefore, under Griffith, the 
change regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction must be applied 
retroactively to Kinne's case. As the law changed during the time Kinne's case was on 
direct review and no final decision had been made, an error does exist and the first factor 
of the Olano test has been met. 
The second prong of the Olano test is that the error must be plain, however, in 
Olano. upreme Court did not address at what stage of direc t t ev levi the 
error must be plain, only that it must be plain under current law. Johnson at 467 
(emphasis added). In Johnson, the error at the time of appeal was clear but was not clear 
a i p r o n g 0 Qlano test had 
been met. The error in the instant matter was also clear at the time of appeal. At the time 
of Kinne's trial, the law regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction was settled, no 
error existed, and e 
time of Kinne's appeal, the law had changed and, under current law, an error thus existed. 
Because this case is still on direct review, and an error exists under current law, the second 
p r o n v i l l ' ( l ie O l a u o illlcsJ h a s ilk .till1 , IIHVIII IIIIIIII 
1 * 
The third prong of Olano is that the error must affect substantial rights. In Johnson. 
the Court held that the plain error fit within the scope of limited cases in which structural 
error existed, but did not determine that Johnson had proven that the error affected her 
substantial rights. The Court cited a case in which it held that, "the erroneous definition of 
'reasonable doubt' vitiated all of the jury's findings because one could only speculate what 
a properly charged jury might have done." Johnson at 469, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana. 
508 U.S. 275, 280, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Although the United 
States Supreme Court determined that Johnson did not meet the third factor under Olano, 
this is not the case in the instant matter. 
In the instant matter, the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" had a 
substantial affect on Kinne's rights based upon this Court's determination in Reves. 
Allowing the jury to use a phrase that has since been ruled constitutionally unsound 
affected Kinne's rights because, as stated in Sullivan, it rendered the jury findings 
ineffective and only allowed the appellate court to speculate on what the jury may have 
done had they received a proper instruction. Allowing the jury to convict under the 
deficient instruction led to a substantial risk that Kinne was convicted on a standard that 
fell below that of the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Use of the phrase affected 
Kinne's due process rights, severely prejudicing Kinne's constitutional rights. U.S.C.A. 
CONST. AMEND. V, VI, and XIV; and UT. CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12. 
In Olano. the United States Supreme Court also held that, "[w]hen the first three 
parts of Olano are satisfied, an appellate court must then determine whether the forfeited 
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error " 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings' " before it may exercise its discretion to correct the error. Olano, 507 U.S., 
at36, 113 S.Ct, at 1779 {quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S., at 160, 56 S.Ct, at 392). In the 
instant matter, the Court of Appeals did not address what repercussions may have come 
from the error in the jury instruction in the instant matter because they felt there was no 
error, although the instruction was clearly determined to be unconstitutional by this Court 
and violates the standard set forth in Victor on which the decision of the Court of Appeals 
relies. Allowing a reasonable doubt jury instruction that has been determined to be 
unconstitutional stand would substantially affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings in allowing a violation of an individual's basic due process rights. 
U.S.C.A. CONST. AMEND. V, VI, and XIV § 1; and UT. CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12. 
U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV § 1, reads as follows: 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
(Emphasis added). UT. CONST., ART. I § 24, states that "[a]ll laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation." The Utah Court of Appeals recently held that "[t]he 
federal Equal Protection Clause and state's Uniform Operation of Laws Clause embody 
the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and 
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persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the 
same." State ex. rel. Z.CL 2005 UT App 562, J8, fii. 5, 128 P.3d 561. The "fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings" articulated in Olano necessarily hinges 
in this matter on the question of whether Kinne should be treated similarly under the analysis 
to the Reyes decision and, if Kinne is found to be "similarly situated," then the federal Equal 
Protection Clause and our state's Uniform Operation of Laws Clause both dictate that he 
should be entitled to the rights as articulated under the Reyes analysis. 
Kinne clearly is similarly situated to the analysis undertaken in Reyes. The Reyes 
decision, as more particularly set forth above, specifically dealt with the phrase "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" in the reasonable doubt jury instruction, wherein this Court abandoned the 
phrase as carrying a substantial risk that a jury could find a defendant guilty of a standard 
below "beyond a reasonable doubt." Kinne's jury instruction contained the phrase that 
carries the substantial risk. The Reyes decision came down on June 7,2005, and Kinne filed 
his brief in reliance upon that determination thereafter. Fairness, integrity and public 
reputation of judicial proceedings dictate that Kinne should be allowed to rely upon case law 
current at the time of the filing of his direct appeal and should be afforded the protection 
from such unconstitutional phraseology, as found by this Court in Reyes. 
The Utah Court of Appeals failed to address the issue regarding the application of 
exceptional circumstances in the instant matter. The law in this matter was settled at the time 
of Kinne's trial, therefore, Kinne's trial counsel could not have reasonably objected 
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at trial, because no issue existed at that time. As Johnson stated, to place the burden in 
these instances on counsel to object would "...result in counsel's inevitably making a long 
and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by 
existing precedent." Ibid., 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. When Kinne filed his 
appeal, there had been a substantial change in law and the interpretation of the law that 
would allow Utah's exceptional circumstances rubric to apply. The Utah Court of 
Appeals, however, erroneously applied Utah's "plain error" standard rather than the 
federal "plain error on appeal" standard in both Halls, and subsequently in the instant 
matter. The Utah Court of Appeals clearly should have applied the expanded "plain error 
on appeal" standard found under Johnson, supra, which successfully merges the necessary 
elements of Utah's "plain error" standard and mimics the Utah appellate court's holdings 
respecting Utah's "exceptional circumstances" rubric. 
Utah's "plain error" standard would have required that the trial court be aware of 
this Court's determination in Reyes prior to the decision being rendered and would have 
placed an undue burden on the trial court to predict the outcome of Reyes or merit reversal 
based on their failure to do so. By failing to apply the correct "exceptional circumstances" 
rubric or the Johnson "plain error on appeal" standard, the Utah Court of Appeals 
mistakenly determined that Kinne's due process rights and right to an impartial jury were 
protected. In its erroneous decision, the Utah Court of Appeals instead violated Kinne's 
rights under the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION and the UTAH CONSTITUTION, as cited 
herein supra. 
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ft. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION HEREIN DIRECTLY 
CONTRADICTS STATE V. REYES. 
The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction in this matter was the use of the 
phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt." In the Decision for this matter, the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" used in Kinne and the phrase 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" used in Reyes were similar, and that the use of the phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" in the jury instruction was not fatal because it adequately 
conveyed the concept of beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury under the Victor standards. 
Kinne at ^1 . 
In State v. Villarreal 889 P.2d 419, 425, (Utah, 1995), however, this Court stated, 
"[fjor an error to be reversible, it must be harmful." See UT. R..EVTD. 103(a); UT. 
R..CRIM.P. 30(a); State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). The Court of 
Appeals held that an error does not require reversal if it is " 'sufficiently inconsequential 
that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings.'" Villarreal. at 958 {quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989)). That rule, however, does not govern errors that are constitutional in nature. Id. 
Where "the error in question amounts to a violation of a defendant's right.. .guaranteed 
by . . .the United States Constitution, its harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, 
i.e., reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987), citing Harrington v. California. 395 U.S. 250, 
254,89 S.Ct. 1726,1728-29,23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). 
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Contrary to the Decision, due process violations are fatal in circumstances such as 
the instant matter. In rendering the Decision in this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
in essence determined that although the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" was 
abandoned as unconstitutional in Reyes, that the use of it in the instant matter is harmless, 
thus contradicting this Court's holding in Villarreal and Reyes, As stated in Villarreal 
errors of a constitutional nature must be judged by a higher standard, the standard that the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals failed to undertake an 
analysis of any standard of harmless or fatal error in this matter. Allowing the word 
"eliminate" to be used still created a substantial risk that Kinne was convicted on a 
standard lower than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt". 
In Reves this Court stated as follows: 
The notion of 'obviating' doubt is cumbersome at best where proof is scant 
or lacking in credibility. In these instances, a description of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction 
concerning the strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and useful 
concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that requires 
jurors to identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes them. 
Reyes at f26 (emphasis added). Requiring jurors to identify doubts and determine if the 
evidence overcomes them is, in essence, requiring them to "eliminate" all doubts. This 
process diminishes the standard that is necessary to convict and was thus abandoned by 
this Court. It is not possible for a person to be found guilty based on a diminished 
standard. This violates their due process rights. The Utah Court of Appeals has provided 
no analysis with regards to how using the phrase "eliminate beyond a reasonable doubt" is 
harmless and not fatal given this Court's determination in Reves. It is not possible to 
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show that this phrase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, VillarreaL As this 
Court determined in Reyes, the very use of the phrase at issue creates a substantial risk 
that Kiinne was convicted on a standard that is lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
The Utah Court of Appeals could not determine that the error was harmless and not fatal 
because the same substantial risk that occurred in Reves still exists. By making this 
determination, the Utah Court of Appeals has violated Kinne's due process rights and not 
only contradicted Reyes but has attempted to overturn this Court's holdings in Reyes 
when it is not within their authority to do so. 
In the instant matter, the Utah Court of Appeals relies on the language in Victor v. 
Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 127 L,Ed.2d 583 (1994) to hold that, as long as the 
jury instruction taken as a whole correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the 
jury, the requirements of due process are met. Halls at f 16; see also, State v. Reves. 2005 
UT 33, f l5, quotinz Victor v. Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 127 L.ED.2d 583 
(1994). The Utah Court of Appeals also held in its analysis in Halls, which relied on 
Victor and ignored Reyes, that it was now the standard to be followed in "assessing the 
validity of reasonable doubt instructions." State v. Halls. 2006 UT App. 142, f 16, 134 
P.3d 1160, citing State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, «pi, 122 P.3d 543. The Utah Court of 
Appeals does not address the risk involved with the use of the phrase "obviate all 
reasonable doubt," particularly in light of the fact that Victor holds that a reasonable doubt 
jury instruction must not "create a reasonable likelihood that 'a reasonable juror could 
have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof 
22 
below that required by the Due Process Clause.' " Reves at ^ [18, citing Victor at 6 {quoting 
Cage v. Louisiana. 498 U.S. 39, 41, 111 S. Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). This Court 
specifically analyzed Victor in Reves as it pertains to the use of the phrase at issue herein 
when it stated that, "[t]he process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard 
is also flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof 
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard." Reves. 2005 UT 
33, [^27, 116 P.3d 305. Even if the remainder of the instruction conveyed the principle of 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, utilizing the phrase "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" still carried the substantial risk that a juror found Kinne guilty based on a degree of 
proof lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt," violating the Victor standards. 
Even if the remainder of the instruction conveyed the principle of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" to the jury, using the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" still 
caused that instruction to carry the substantial risk that a juror found Kinne guilty based 
on a degree of proof lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt." As this Court pointed out, 
use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" in a jury instruction violates Victor, no 
matter what concept the remainder of the instruction may convey. Although Victor states 
that there is no due process violation as long as the instruction as a whole correctly coveys 
the concept of beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not possible to use a phrase in that 
instruction that has been declared to carry a substantial risk, because it violates the second 
standard as set forth in Victor. Victor states that the instruction cannot create a likelihood 
that guilt will be determined on a standard less than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
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For the reasonable doubt jury instruction to comply with Victor standards in this matter, 
the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" could not exist in the instruction. The 
standards as set forth in Victor cannot be met as long as the phrase "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt" is included in the instruction. As analyzed by this Court in Reyes, it is 
not possible to have a constitutionally sound instruction that includes the phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt." 
This Court specifically analyzed Victor and how the phrase "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" violated its standards when it stated in Reyes: 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of 
proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor 
standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: 
the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt 
against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a 
doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is 
sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an 
ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An 
unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof 
will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit. 
Reves. 2005 UT 33, f27, 116 P.3d 305 (emphasis added). On the basis that it diminishes 
the degree of proof necessary to convict, the phrases "obviate all reasonable doubt" or 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" cannot be utilized. Therefore, the remainder of the 
instruction cannot adequately convey the concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" since 
the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" was included. Thus, in the instant matter, the 
Victor standard was violated. 
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In rendering their decision in Halls. 2006 UT App. 142, the Utah Court of Appeals 
also relies on the matter of State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45,121, 122 P.3d 543, in which this 
Court reiterated the Victor standard as the standard under which reasonable doubt jury 
instructions would be reviewed. In Cruz the State argued that the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction test as set forth in State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), should be 
overruled. As set forth by Reyes, this Court complied and held that the Victor standard 
for reasonable doubt jury instructions would apply. Cruz did not expand upon the Victor 
standards, nor did it overrule any of this Court's holdings in Reyes. In fact, Cruz upheld 
Reyes and reiterated that the Victor standard would apply to reasonable doubt jury 
instructions. The Court of Appeals is incorrect in relying upon Cruz because not only 
does Cruz agree with Reyes, it also sets forth Victor as the correct standard for reasonable 
doubt jury instructions to apply, however Cruz does not discuss the remaining Victor 
standard that an instruction cannot create the likelihood that a conviction will occur based 
upon a standard lower than that of beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore it cannot be 
relied upon. 
In Reves. this Court held that the "obviate all reasonable doubt" concept was 
"linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect" and that the potential problem with this 
phrase was that it required a two step undertaking, including identification of the doubt 
and the testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence. Halls at fl7. Allowing 
that phrase to be used in a jury instruction carries with it a substantial risk of guilt being 
founded on a standard lower than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." A phrase that was 
25 
determined to be "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect" by this Court, and 
subsequently abandoned, should not be upheld in a jury instruction by the Utah Court of 
Appeals without analysis as to some type of cure of the risk. The Utah Court of Appeals 
contends that, because the instruction as used in Halls and the instant matter did not 
convey the message to the jury that the State need only refute doubts that are sufficiently 
defined, there was no error or risk associated with this instruction. Id at f 18. However, 
under this Court's determination, the substantial inherent risk based on the use of the 
phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" was not cured. Reyes, at Tfl8. 
The Utah Court of Appeals failed to address the substantial risk associated with the 
phrase "obviate" or "eliminate" all reasonable doubt as used in this matter. They simply 
held that, if the instruction as a whole correctly conveys the principle of reasonable doubt 
as set forth under Victor, then the instruction is adequate. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
failed to show how the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt' does not violate the 
standard outlined in Victor and analyzed in Reyes. This contradicts this Court's 
abandonment of the phrase in Reyes and its holding with regards to the substantial risk 
associated with the use of that phrase. This Court specifically indicated that this phrase 
violates Victor standards, which are the standards upon which the Utah Court of Appeals 
relied in its decision in the instant matter. Reyes at %27. 
It is clear from the analysis above that the reasonable doubt jury instruction used at 
the trial in this matter has been declared unconstitutional by Reyes in that it carries a 
substantial risk that a jury could find a defendant guilty of a standard lower than "beyond 
a reasonable doubt." The reasonable doubt jury instruction used in the instant matter and 
the reasonable doubt jury instruction used in Reves both contained this phrase, carrying 
the same substantial risk analyzed by this court. Therefore, Kinne should be afforded the 
same relief that was afforded Reyes with regards to the reasonable doubt jury instruction. 
Their circumstances are similar and, therefore, the protection of their rights by the Utah 
appellate courts should be similar. 
HI. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In State v. Villarreal 889 P.2d 419, 425, (Utah,1995), this Court stated, "[fjor an 
error to be reversible, it must be harmful." See UT. R..EVID. 103(a); UT. R..CRM.P. 
30(a); State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). The Court of Appeals held that 
an error does not require reversal if it is '"sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" 
Villarreal at 958 (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)). That rule, 
however, does not govern errors that are constitutional in nature. Id. Where "the error in 
question amounts to a violation of a defendant's right . . .guaranteed by . . .the United 
States Constitution, its harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal is 
required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hackford. 737 
P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987), citing Harrington v. California. 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 
1726,1728-29,23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). 
In State v. Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), this Court held that, "[ejrror is 
reversible only if review of record persuades Supreme Court that without error there was a 
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reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant; this rule applies to 
errors in jury instructions in criminal cases." In determining whether a federal 
constitutional error in the course of a criminal trial requires reversal, the United States 
Supreme Court analyzed this specific issue and stated as follows: 
The inquiry. . .is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a 
guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty 
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. 
That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in 
fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict 
might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee. 
The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have 
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-not that the jury's actual 
finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been 
different absent the constitutional error. That is not enough. See Yates, 
supra, 500 U.S., at 413-414, 111 S.Ct, at 1898 (SCALIA, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). The Sixth Amendment requires more than 
appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed 
verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual 
jury finding of guilty. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614, 
66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946). 
But the essential connection to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" factual 
finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a 
misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings. 
A reviewing court can only engage in pure speculation-its view of what a 
reasonable jury would have done. And when it does that, "the wrong entity 
judge[s] the defendant guilty." Rose, supra, 478 U.S., at 578, 106 S.Ct., at 
3106. 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-281, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 
(1993). In the instant matter, Kinne has clearly shown that the jury instruction consisted 
of a misdescription of the burden of proof, as this Court specifically analyzed in Reyes. 
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Thus, the jury findings are vitiated. This Court cannot speculate on what the jurors would 
have done absent the phrase at issue herein. Kinne's constitutional rights were violated by 
the Utah Court of Appeals' determination and such violation can only be corrected by this 
Court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision in this matter that directly 
contradicts this Court's decision in Reyes, effectively violating Kinne's constitutional 
rights under UNITED STATES CONST. AMENDS. V and VI and UTAH CONST., ART. I §§7, 
12 and 24. Such a determination requires reversal of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
Decision, and remand for a new trial consistent with the current case law respecting 
language utilized in reasonable doubt jury instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
and remand the Utah Court of Appeals decision dated April 20, 2006 and any other relief 
this Court deems pertinent. 
DATED this $/& day of October, 2006. 
Autumn Fitzgera 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Devon Kinne, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040955-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 2 0 , 2006) 
2QQ6 UT App 156 
Seventh District, Monticello Department, 041700014 
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
Attorneys: K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Moab, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Billings. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant Devon Kinne appeals his convictions for one count 
each of receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a 
second degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (2005); 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, see id. 
§ 58~37a-5(l) (2002); burglary, a second degree felony, see id. 
§ 76-6-202 (2003); and theft, a second degree felony, see id. 
§§ 76-6-412, -404 (2003). We affirm. 
First, Defendant argues that the trial court's reasonable 
doubt jury instruction incorrectly stated the law and thus 
violated his due process rights. At Defendant's trial, the 
court's reasonable doubt jury instruction complied with State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled in relevant part 
fey State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. The instruction 
informed the jury that "[t]he State must eliminate all reasonable 
doubt." However, following Defendant's conviction, the Utah 
Supreme Court expressly abandoned the "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" requirement of the Robertson test. See Reves, 2005 UT 33 
at f30 (quotations omitted). 
Although the phrases "obviate all reasonable doubt" and 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" are similar, we conclude the 
language of the instruction in the present case was not fatal to 
the reasonable doubt instruction. In eliminating the "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" requirement, see id., the Utah Supreme 
Court essentially adopted the test enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). 
In Victor, the Court stated that reasonable doubt jury 
instructions are adequate if "taken as a whole, the[y] . . . 
correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury." 
511 U.S. at 22. In State v, Cruz. 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543, and 
in State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, jury instructions containing 
the phrases "dispel all reasonable doubt," Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at 
111, and "eliminate all reasonable doubt," Halls, 2006 UT App 142 
at 1l2, were held to not constitute error. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45 
at 122; Halls. 2006 UT App 142 at 120. Both instructions 
complied with the test enunciated in Victor, see 511 U.S. at 22, 
and expressly adopted in Cruz, see 2005 UT 45 at 121, that a 
reasonable doubt jury instruction must "correctly communicate the 
principle of reasonable doubt" to the jury. Id.; Halls, 2006 UT 
App 142 at 120. In this case, as in Cruz and Halls, the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction "correctly communicate [d] the 
principle of reasonable doubt" to the jury. Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at 
121; Halls. 2006 UT App 142 at 120. 
Defendant also argues he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel when his attorney failed to file a motion for a directed 
verdict following the denial of his motion to dismiss. To 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, "the defendant 
must show that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant." Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
Defendant argues that although his counsel moved to dismiss 
the counts charged against him, his counsel's performance was 
deficient when she failed to also move for a directed verdict 
because Utah appellate courts have imposed different standards 
for granting motions for directed verdicts than for granting 
motions to dismiss. We disagree. 
"If the State fails to produce 'believable evidence of all 
the elements of the crime charged,' the trial court must dismiss 
the charges." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,140, 70 P.3d 111 
(quoting State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9,1l3, 20 P.3d 300). Believable 
evidence is evidence that is "capable of supporting a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 141 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
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In a motion for a directed verdict at the end of the State's 
case, the trial court must decide if "the State . . . 
establish[ed] a prima facie case against the defendant by 
producing 'believable evidence of all the elements of the crime 
charged.1" Clark, 2001 UT 9 at 1l3 (quoting State v. Emmett. 839 
P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992)). 
In the present case, the trial judge denied a motion to 
dismiss at the close of the Statefs case. Accordingly, the trial 
court found there was believable evidence for each element of the 
crimes charged "capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at 141 (quotations and 
citation omitted). Therefore, a motion for a directed verdict 
would have been futile because if the trial court believed there 
was evidence capable of supporting a verdict of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the trial court would also find the jury 
capable of finding Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant argues that, even if the court finds that the 
motion to dismiss could be construed as functionally equivalent 
to a motion for a directed verdict, the motion was deficient in 
its content when it failed to argue that there was no reliable 
evidence tying Defendant to the crime. However, the State 
presented a witness whose testimony directly tied Defendant to 
the crimes charged. The outcome of this case hinged largely on 
the credibility given to the Statefs key witness. Determinations 
of witness credibility are the exclusive province of the jury. 
See State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). Therefore, 
Defendant has not shown that the failure to argue this issue 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
We affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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